Turkestani,3 a Soviet citizen,4 or an Uzbek.5 Such studies have mostly focused on socio-political circumstances. Additionally, in the past two decades several scholars have investigated the formation of "the moral self" in contemporary Central Asia, producing in-depth studies based on field research.6 These studies have put practices and individual experiences at their center, and highlight the various inner and outer aspects of moral education in or for a given community. Yet to this day there has not been a comparative study of moral teaching in the region, and none that looks at its long-term development.
The proposed comparison started with my observation that, in post-Soviet Uzbekistan, several types of ethical norms and values are propagated at the same time, and are thus in competition. These different ethics are propagated in "moral education" schoolbooks commissioned by the state, in sermons of Islamic "fundamentalist" groups and in texts used in the traditional Muslim schools. I argue that this competition has its roots in the struggles for the correct form of ethics that started with the attempt at a "moral reform" by the Central Asian Muslim educational reformers, the Jadīds, at the turn of the 20th century. In the subsequent Soviet period, the state-promoted ideal of a Soviet citizen ran parallel to what might be called the formation of a Soviet Muslim citizen, with either "traditionalist" or "fundamentalist" underpinnings. I aim at identifying continuities, similarities, and differences between these various kinds of moral education, and I highlight resemblances between schools of thought and ideologies that consider each other as rivals or worse. Some of the
